Closing the backdoor: The new TurkStream is here. Can the West stop it?

Martin Vladimirov is director of the Energy and Climate Program at the Center for the Study of Democracy.
Announcing its plans for what could be called TurkStream 2 on Aug. 21, Turkey finally dropped all pretenses.
According to the country’s energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, the state-owned gas monopoly BOTAŞ would now be able export around 7 to 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas through Bulgaria to Central Europe under a new brand called “Turkish Blend,” mixing gas from various sources.
While Russia is set to have a 40 percent share in this mix, the real amount may well be higher, as Gazprom and BOTAŞ have been working out the details of a Russian gas hub in Turkey since early 2023.
This expansion will make use of the existing European extension of TurkStream, as well as a 2023 agreement between Bulgarian public gas supplier Bulgargaz, Bulgarian system operator Bulgartransgaz and BOTAŞ, which allows the Turkish company to export around 3.6 bcm per year to the EU. And maximizing the TurkStream pipeline network in this way will add another 4 bcm of camouflaged Russian gas exports to Europe.
Just like Russian oil companies sell relabeled oil products to Europe from Turkey, India, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, Europe cannot look away as Gazprom tries to launder Russian gas exports. And along this path, the EU’s decision to ban the trans-shipments of Russian LNG destined for Asia via European ports is a small but crucial step in phasing out Russian gas. But there’s more that could be done.
Despite efforts by major European natural gas consumers to reduce dependence, Russian gas still accounts for 15 percent of the EU’s total gas imports, even overtaking U.S. LNG supply to Europe this year. In simple terms, Europe currently spends twice as much on Russian energy as it gives Ukraine in aid.
Moreover, apart from Russian LNG exports to Europe, natural gas flows through Ukraine and TurkStream are also delivering Russian gas to Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Bulgaria and the Western Balkans. So, to fully cut off the Kremlin from EU-generated gas profits and deprive it of its energy weapon once the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine ceases at the end of 2024, the EU must halt Russian gas transit through TurkStream’s European expansion.
The U.S. could accelerate this by sanctioning the Gazprom-led project and all companies involved in TurkStream-linked infrastructure. Meanwhile, simultaneously stopping the gas transit through Ukraine and TurkStream would allow European clients of Russian gas to suspend or renegotiate their long-term contracts with Gazprom.
The impact of cutting Russian pipeline gas imports shouldn’t be exaggerated either. Gazprom sales via Turkey and Ukraine make up around 8 percent of total EU gas demand, which could be replaced with global LNG supply, or by reverse flows from saturated markets in Northwestern Europe.
But while the Ukrainian route can be stopped overnight, halting TurkStream will be more challenging. TurkStream not only facilitates continued Russian gas exports, but it also undermines European diversification by flooding the market with discounted gas. And this cheap Russian gas jeopardizes domestic production projects in the Black Sea, while also delaying alternative LNG imports through terminals in Greece, Croatia and Poland, which risks creating stranded assets.
Moreover, the BOTAŞ deal allows Russia to obscure the origins of its gas, providing Gazprom with a new outlet to sell to its clients directly, bypassing Ukraine. As such, these new plans would complete Russia’s goal of circumventing Ukraine for its gas sales to Europe, side-stepping potential sanctions.
Turkey’s lack of obligation to adhere to EU rules further complicates efforts to monitor the gas flow through its borders as well. And there’s even a chance the Turkish-Bulgarian agreement might actually violate EU competition law, as it blocks third-party gas companies’ access to the gas transmission network. Thus, the EU’s antitrust body, DG Competition, has already begun assessing the deal for rules rigging.
Given all this, the EU could assume all gas entering from Turkey and Ukraine is Russian, and generate revenue for Ukraine’s reconstruction by taxing the gap between discounted Russian gas and prevailing hub prices in Europe.
The EU could also set a clear phaseout date for all Russian gas imports and develop a robust mechanism to verify and trace the origins of gas entering its market. As it stands, the European Commission’s REPowerEU initiative, which began after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, only recommends member countries halt Russian gas purchases but doesn’t oblige them. Instituting such a system would ensure European consumers aren’t funding the Kremlin’s aggression and close the loopholes allowing Russian gas to flow under the radar.
As Ukraine continues its military incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the Kremlin will inevitably find it harder to achieve a breakthrough in the Donbas. And fully decoupling from Russian energy at this time would show Europe still stands with Ukraine.